

Simple Games

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- 1 Simple Games
- 2 Problems on simple games

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 - N is a set of players,
 - $\mathcal{W} \subseteq \mathcal{P}(N)$ is a monotone set of *winning coalitions*.
 - $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{P}(N) \setminus \mathcal{W}$ is the set of *losing coalitions*.

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A **simple game** is a pair (N, \mathcal{W}) :
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 - $\mathcal{L} = \mathcal{P}(N) \setminus \mathcal{W}$ is the set of *losing coalitions*.
- Members of $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$ are called *players* or *voters*.
Any set of voters is called a *coalition*
 - N is the *grand coalition*
 - \emptyset is the *null coalition*
 - the subsets of N that are in \mathcal{W} are the *winning coalitions*
 - A subset of N that is not in \mathcal{W} is a *losing coalition*.

Simple games: Representation

Due to monotonicity, any one of the following families of coalitions define a simple game on a set of players N :

- *winning coalitions* \mathcal{W} .
- *losing coalitions* \mathcal{L} .
- *minimal winning coalitions* \mathcal{W}^m
$$\mathcal{W}^m = \{X \in \mathcal{W}; \forall Z \in \mathcal{W}, Z \not\subseteq X\}$$
- *maximal losing coalitions* \mathcal{L}^M
$$\mathcal{L}^M = \{X \in \mathcal{L}; \forall Z \in \mathcal{L}, X \not\subseteq Z\}$$

This provides us with many representation forms for simple games.

Weighted voting games

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A simple game for which there exists a **quota** q and it is possible to assign to each $i \in N$ a **weight** w_i , so that

$$X \in \mathcal{W} \text{ iff } \sum_{i \in X} w_i \geq q.$$

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$$X \in \mathcal{W} \text{ iff } \sum_{i \in X} w_i \geq q.$$

- WVG can be represented by a tuple of integers $(q; w_1, \dots, w_n)$.

as **any weighted game admits such an integer realization**,
[Carreras and Freixas, Math. Soc.Sci., 1996]

Vector weighted voting games

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Both are simple games

- A simple game Γ is a **vector weighted voting game** if there are WVGs $\Gamma_1, \dots, \Gamma_k$, for some $k \geq 1$, so that $\Gamma = \Gamma_1 \cap \dots \cap \Gamma_k$.

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The game with $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ where the minimal winning coalitions are the sets $\{1, 2\}$ and $\{3, 4\}$ is not a WVG.

- Assume it is given by $(q; w_1, w_2, w_3, w_4)$.
- We have $w_1 + w_2 \geq q$ and $w_3 + w_4 \geq q$.
- Thus $\max\{w_1, w_2\} \geq q/2$ and $\max\{w_3, w_4\} \geq q/2$,
- So, $\max\{w_1, w_2\} + \max\{w_3, w_4\} \geq q$ which cannot be.

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 - Take a losing coalition C and consider the game in which players in C have weight 0 and players outside C 1, set the quote to 1.
Any set that is not contained in C wins!
 - The intersection of the above games describes Γ .
A winning coalition cannot be a subset of any losing coalition.
- The **dimension** of a simple games is the minimum number of VWVGs that allows its representation as VWVG

A representation as WVGs

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The game Γ with $N = \{1, 2, 3, 4\}$ where the minimal winning coalitions are the sets $\{1, 2\}$ and $\{3, 4\}$ is not a WVG.

- The maximal losing coalitions are $\{\{1, 3\}, \{1, 4\}, \{2, 3\}, \{2, 4\}\}$
- This gives four WVG, according to the previous construction

$$\Gamma = [1; 0, 1, 0, 1] \cap [1; 0, 1, 1, 0] \cap [1; 1, 0, 0, 1] \cap [1; 1, 0, 1, 0].$$

Input representations

- Simple Games
 (N, \mathcal{W}) : extensive winning, (N, \mathcal{W}^m) : minimal winning
 (N, \mathcal{L}) : extensive losing, (N, \mathcal{L}^M) maximal losing
 (N, C) : monotone circuit winning
 (N, F) : monotone formula winning,
- Weighted voting games: $(q; w_1, \dots, w_n)$
- Vector weighted voting games:
 $(q_1; w_1^1, \dots, w_n^1), \dots, (q_k; w_1^k, \dots, w_n^k)$

All numbers are integers

The core of simple games

The core of simple games

- It is standard to assume that the grand coalition forms, even if the simple game is not superadditive.
- A player is a **veto player** if $v(C) = 0$, for any $C \subseteq N \setminus \{i\}$.
- Ex: Consider the unanimity game (N, v) where $v(C) = 0$, if $C \neq N$ and $v(N) = 1$.

The game indeed is a simple game and can be described in (minimal) winning form by $(N, \{N\})$.

In the unanimity game all players are veto players.

The core of simple games

Theorem

A simple game has non-empty core iff it has a veto player.

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A simple game has non-empty core iff it has a veto player.

- If Γ has a veto player i .
 - Consider the payoff $x_i = 1$ and $x_j = 0$, for $j \neq i$
 - For C with $i \in C$, $v(C) = 1$ and $x(C) = 1$.
 - For C with $i \notin C$, $v(C) = 0$ and $x(C) = 0$.
 - Thus, x is in the core.
- If Γ does not have a veto player and non-empty core.
 - Consider a payoff x that is in the core.
 - $x(N) = v(N) = 1$, so there exists i with $x_i > 0$.
 - So, $x(N \setminus \{i\}) < 1$. But, $v(N \setminus \{i\}) = 1$ as i is not a veto player.
 - Thus, x is not in the core.

Is the core empty?

- Determining if the core is empty or not can be done by checking for every player whether it is a veto player or not.
- For this it is enough to check whether $v(N \setminus \{i\}) = 0$.
- For reasonable v , polynomial time computable, this can be done in poly time

Shapley value and Banzhaf index

- Player i is **pivotal** for coalition C if $v(C) = 1$ and $v(C \setminus \{i\}) = 0$.
- The sum counts those the terms for which the player is pivota.

$$\varphi_i(\Gamma) = \frac{1}{n!} |\{i \text{ is pivotal for } S_\pi(i)\}|$$

- $\varphi_i(\Gamma)$ is the probability that player i turns a losing coalition into a winning one.
- The Banzhaf value gives the probability of this fact over **random** coalitions.
Players in $N \setminus \{i\}$ select to be or not in the coalition tossing a fair coin.

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Problems on simple games

In general we state a property P , for simple games, and consider the associated decision problem which has the form:

Name: IsP

Input: A simple game/WVG/VWVG Γ

Question: Does Γ satisfy property P ?

Four properties

A simple game (N, \mathcal{W}) is

- **strong** if $S \notin \mathcal{W}$ implies $N \setminus S \in \mathcal{W}$.
- **proper** if $S \in \mathcal{W}$ implies $N \setminus S \notin \mathcal{W}$.
- a **weighted voting game**.
- a **vector weighted voting game**.

IsStrong: Simple Games

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Theorem

The ISSTRONG problem, when Γ is given in explicit winning or losing form or in maximal losing form can be solved in polynomial time.

- First observe that, given a family of subsets F , we can check, for any set in F , whether its complement is not in F in polynomial time.
- Therefore, the ISSTRONG problem, when the input is given in explicit winning or losing form is polynomial time solvable.

IsStrong: Simple Games losing forms

Γ is **strong** if $S \notin W$ implies $N \setminus S \in W$

- A simple game is not strong iff

$$\exists S \subseteq N : S \in \mathcal{L} \wedge N \setminus S \in \mathcal{L}$$

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which is equivalent to

$$\exists S \subseteq N : \exists L_1, L_2 \in \mathcal{L}^M : S \subseteq L_1 \wedge N \setminus S \subseteq L_2$$

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- which is equivalent to there are two maximal losing coalitions L_1 and L_2 such that $L_1 \cup L_2 = N$.

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- This can be checked in polynomial time, given \mathcal{L}^M .



IsStrong: minimal winning forms

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Theorem

The ISSTRONG problem is coNP-complete when the input game is given in explicit minimal winning form.

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Theorem

The ISSTRONG problem is coNP-complete when the input game is given in explicit minimal winning form.

- The property can be expressed as

$$\forall S [(S \in \mathcal{W}) \text{ or } (S \notin \mathcal{W} \text{ and } N \setminus S \in \mathcal{W})]$$

- Observe that the property $S \in \mathcal{W}$ can be checked in polynomial time given S and \mathcal{W}^m .
- Thus the problem belongs to coNP.

IsStrong: minimal winning forms

- We provide a polynomial time reduction from the complement of the NP-complete **set splitting** problem.
- An instance of the **set splitting problem** is a collection C of subsets of a finite set N . The question is whether it is possible to partition N into two subsets P and $N \setminus P$ such that no subset in C is entirely contained in either P or $N \setminus P$.

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- We have to decide whether $P \subseteq N$ exists such that

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We associate to a set splitting instance (N, C) the simple game in explicit minimal winning form (N, C^m) .

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- Now assume that $P \subseteq N$ satisfies

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- This implies $S \not\subseteq P$ and $S \not\subseteq N \setminus P$, for any $S \in C$ since any set in C contains a set in C^m .

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- This means that P and $N \setminus P$ are losing coalitions in the game (N, C^m) .
- So, $S \not\subseteq P$ and $S \not\subseteq N \setminus P$, for any $S \in C^m$.
- This implies $S \not\subseteq P$ and $S \not\subseteq N \setminus P$, for any $S \in C$ since any set in C contains a set in C^m .
- Therefore, (N, C) has a set splitting iff (N, C^m) is not proper.

IsProper: winning forms

Γ is **proper** if $S \in \mathcal{W}$ implies $N \setminus S \notin \mathcal{W}$.

Theorem

The ISPROPER problem, when the game is given in explicit winning or losing form or in minimal winning form, can be solved in polynomial time.

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The ISPROPER problem, when the game is given in explicit winning or losing form or in minimal winning form, can be solved in polynomial time.

- As before, given a family of subsets F , we can check, for any set in F , whether its complement is not in F in polynomial time.

Taking into account the definitions, the ISPROPER problem is polynomial time solvable for the explicit forms

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- equivalent to there are two minimal winning coalitions W_1 and W_2 such that $W_1 \cap W_2 = \emptyset$.
- Which can be checked in polynomial time when \mathcal{W}^m is given.

IsProper: maximal losing form

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Theorem

The ISPROPER problem is coNP-complete when the input game is given in extensive maximal losing form.

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- which is equivalent to

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- which is equivalent to

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- Therefore ISPROPER belongs to coNP.

IsProper: maximal losing form

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To show that the problem is also coNP-hard we provide a reduction from the IsStrong problem for games given in extensive minimal winning form.

- If a family C of subsets of N is minimal then the family $\{N \setminus L : L \in C\}$ is maximal.
- Given a game $\Gamma = (N, \mathcal{W}^m)$, in minimal winning form, we construct the game $\Gamma' = (N, \{N \setminus L : L \in \mathcal{W}^m\})$ in maximal losing form.
- Which can be obtained in polynomial time.

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- Which can be obtained in polynomial time.
- Besides, Γ is strong iff Γ' is proper.

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Question: Is there $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ for which

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$$\sum_{i \in S} x_i = \sum_{i \notin S} x_i.$$

Observe that, for any instance of the PARTITION problem in which the sum of the n input numbers is odd, the answer must be NO.

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Theorem

The ISSTRONG and the ISPROPER problems, when the input is described by an integer realization of a weighted game $(q; w)$, are coNP-complete.

- From the definitions of strong, proper it is straightforward to show that both problems belong to coNP.
- Observe that the weighted game with integer representation $(2; 1, 1, 1)$ is both proper and strong.

Hardness

We transform an instance $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ of PARTITION into a realization of a weighted game according to the following schema

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} (q(x); x) & \text{when } x_1 + \dots + x_n \text{ is even,} \\ (2; 1, 1, 1) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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- Function f can be computed in polynomial time provided q does.
- Independently of q , when $x_1 + \dots + x_n$ is *odd*, x is a NO input for partition, but $f(x)$ is a YES instance of ISSTRONG or ISPROPER.

IsStrong

Assume that $x_1 + \dots + x_n$ is even.

Let $s = (x_1 + \dots + x_n)/2$ and $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Set $q(x) = s + 1$.

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Let $s = (x_1 + \dots + x_n)/2$ and $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Set $q(x) = s + 1$.

- If there is $S \subset N$ such that $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = s$, then $\sum_{i \notin S} x_i = s$, thus both S and $N \setminus S$ are losing coalitions and $f(x)$ is not strong.

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Let $s = (x_1 + \dots + x_n)/2$ and $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Set $q(x) = s + 1$.

- If there is $S \subset N$ such that $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = s$, then $\sum_{i \notin S} x_i = s$, thus both S and $N \setminus S$ are losing coalitions and $f(x)$ is not strong.
- If S and $N \setminus S$ are losing coalitions in $f(x)$.
 If $\sum_{i \in S} x_i < s$ then $\sum_{i \notin S} x_i \geq s + 1$, $N \setminus S$ should be winning.
 Thus $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = \sum_{i \notin S} x_i = s$, and there exists a partition of x .

IsProper

Assume that $x_1 + \dots + x_n$ is even.

Let $s = (x_1 + \dots + x_n)/2$ and $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Set $q(x) = s$.

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- If there is $S \subset N$ such that $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = s$, then $\sum_{i \notin S} x_i = s$, thus both S and $N \setminus S$ are winning coalitions and $f(x)$ is not proper.
- When $f(x)$ is not proper

$$\exists S \subseteq N : \sum_{i \in S} x_i \geq s \wedge \sum_{i \notin S} x_i \geq s,$$

and thus $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = s$.