

More on weighted voting games

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A explicit representation as $[q; w]$ for a WVG Γ is called a **realization** of Γ .

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- Two realizations $[q_1; w_1]$ and $[q_2; w_2]$ on the same set N players are **equivalent** if, for $S \subseteq N$, $w_1(S) \geq q_1$ iff $w_2(S) \geq q_2$.

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- Two realizations $[q_1; w_1]$ and $[q_2; w_2]$ on the same set N players are **equivalent** if, for $S \subseteq N$, $w_1(S) \geq q_1$ iff $w_2(S) \geq q_2$.
- The notion of equivalence naturally extends to other representations forms for simple games.

Integrality of Weights and Quota

Theorem

For any weighted voting game $\Gamma = [q; w]$ with $|N| = n$, there exists an equivalent weighted voting game $\Gamma' = [q'; w']$ such that

- Γ and Γ' are equivalents,
- $w' \in (\mathbb{Z}^+)^n$ and $q' \in \mathbb{Z}^+$, and
- $w'_{\max} = O(2^{n \log n})$.

[Carreras and Freixas, Math. Soc.Sci., 1996]

It can be deduced from

[S. Muroga. Threshold Logic and its Applications, 1971].

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- We write $w(C)$ to denote the total weight of a coalition C , i.e., we set $w(C) = \sum_{i \in C} w_i$
- We set $w_{\max} = \max_{i \in N} w_i$

IsSimple and IsStrong

A simple game (N, \mathcal{W}) is

- **strong** if $S \notin \mathcal{W}$ implies $N \setminus S \in \mathcal{W}$.
- **proper** if $S \in \mathcal{W}$ implies $N \setminus S \notin \mathcal{W}$.

IsSimple and IsStrong

- We analyze the complexity of the `ISPROPER` and `ISSTRONG` problems when the input game is an integer realization $[q; w]$ of a WVG Γ .

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Name: PARTITION

Input: n integer values, x_1, \dots, x_n

Question: Is there $S \subseteq \{1, \dots, n\}$ for which

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- Observe that, for any instance of the PARTITION problem in which the sum of the n input numbers is odd, the answer must be NO.

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Theorem

The ISSTRONG and the ISPROPER problems, when the input is described by an integer realization of a weighted game $[q; w]$, are coNP-complete.

- From the definitions of strong, proper it is straightforward to show that both problems belong to coNP.
- Observe that the weighted game with integer representation $(2; 1, 1, 1)$ is both proper and strong.

Hardness

We transform an instance $x = (x_1, \dots, x_n)$ of PARTITION into a realization of a weighted game according to the following schema

$$f(x) = \begin{cases} (q(x); x) & \text{when } x_1 + \dots + x_n \text{ is even,} \\ (2; 1, 1, 1) & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

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- Function f can be computed in polynomial time provided q does.
- Independently of q , when $x_1 + \dots + x_n$ is *odd*, x is a NO input for partition, but $f(x)$ is a YES instance of ISSTRONG or ISPROPER.

IsStrong

Assume that $x_1 + \dots + x_n$ is even.

Let $s = (x_1 + \dots + x_n)/2$ and $N = \{1, \dots, n\}$.

Set $q(x) = s + 1$.

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- If S and $N \setminus S$ are losing coalitions in $f(x)$.

If $\sum_{i \in S} x_i < s$ then $\sum_{i \notin S} x_i \geq s + 1$, $N \setminus S$ should be winning.

Thus $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = \sum_{i \notin S} x_i = s$, and there exists a partition of x .

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- If there is $S \subset N$ such that $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = s$, then $\sum_{i \notin S} x_i = s$, thus both S and $N \setminus S$ are winning coalitions and $f(x)$ is not proper.
- When $f(x)$ is not proper

$$\exists S \subseteq N : \sum_{i \in S} x_i \geq s \wedge \sum_{i \notin S} x_i \geq s,$$

and thus $\sum_{i \in S} x_i = s$.

Power and weight

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- If the game in question is a WVG, one may expect that ϕ_i is closely related to w_i .
- It is not hard to show that power is monotone in weight, i.e., for any weighted voting game $\Gamma = [q; w]$ and any two players $i, j \in N$, we have $\phi_i(\Gamma) \leq \phi_j(\Gamma)$ iff $w_i \leq w_j$.

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- However, two agents may have identical voting power even if their weights differ considerably.

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- After the May 2010 elections in the UK, the Conservative Party had 307 seats, the Labour Party had 258 seats, the Liberal Democrats (LibDems) had 57 seats, and all other parties shared the remaining 28 seats (with the most powerful of them getting 8 seats).

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- It is easy to see that in this weighted voting game there are two two-party coalitions (Conservatives+Labour and Conservatives+LibDems) that can get a majority of seats.
- Moreover, if Labour or LibDems want to form a coalition that does not include Conservatives, they need each other (as well as a few minor parties).
- Thus, Labour and LibDems have the same Shapley value, despite being vastly different in size.

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- To determine a player's power, we have to take into account the distribution of the other players' weights as well as the quota.

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- Setting $q = 8$, the smaller players are dummies, so their Shapley value is 0.
- Setting $q = 5$, a player of weight 1 is pivotal only if it appears in the second position, and a player of weight 4 appears in the first position. There are four permutations that satisfy this condition, so the Shapley value of each of the smaller players is $1/6$.

Power and weight:duality

The **dual** of a game $\Gamma = (N, \mathcal{W})$ is the game $\Gamma^d = (N, \mathcal{W}^d)$ where $\mathcal{W}^d = \{S \subseteq N \mid N \setminus S \notin \mathcal{W}\}$.

A coalition S is **blocking** if $N \setminus S \notin \mathcal{W}$

Lemma

Given a WVG $\Gamma = [q; w]$, we have

- $[w(N) + 1 - q; w]$ is a representation of Γ^d .
- for each $i \in N$, $\phi_i(\Gamma) = \phi_i(\Gamma^d)$

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- but as all the numbers are integers, equivalently,
 $w(S) \geq 1 + w(N) - q$
- So, $S \in \mathcal{W}^d$ iff $w(S) \geq 1 + w(N) - q$.

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- Suppose, that for a permutation π and a player i , $w(S_\pi(i)) < q$ and $w(S_\pi(i) \cup \{i\}) \geq q$.
- Let π' be the permutation obtained by reversing π , we have
 $w(S_{\pi'}(i)) = w(N) - w(S_\pi(i)) - w_i \leq w(N) - q < w(N) - q + 1$,
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- Hence, i is pivotal for the permutation π' in the game Γ^d .
- By symmetry, the converse is also true.
- Thus, we have established a bijection between the set of permutations that i is pivotal for in Γ and the set of permutations that i is pivotal for in Γ^d .

EndProof.

Auxiliary results

- For n integer values $w = (w_1, \dots, w_n)$ and an integer x , let $T_w(i, x)$ be the number of possibilities to write the integer x as the sum of some subset of the first i weights.

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- Let $\bar{w} = \sum_{i=1}^n w_i$
- When $x > \bar{w}$, $T_w(i, x) = 0$

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$$T_w(i, x) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } x = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } x > 0 \text{ and } i = 0 \\ T_w(i-1, x) & \text{if } x < w_i \text{ and } i > 0 \\ T_w(i-1, x) + T_w(i-1, x - w_i) & \text{otherwise} \end{cases}$$

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- The table has size $O(xn)$ and each element can be computed in $O(1)$ filling the table by rows.

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- The table has size $O(xn^2)$ and each element can be computed in $O(1)$ filling the table in an adequate order.

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- This allows for the design of algorithms that consume the values as they are computed but do not require to store the complete table.

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- The Banzhaf value is $\beta_i(\Gamma) = \eta_i(\Gamma)/2^{n-1}$

Computing the Banzhaf value

Lemma

For a WVG $\Gamma = (N, \mathcal{W})$ given by an integer realization $[q; w]$, the quantities $\eta_i(\Gamma)$ and $|\mathcal{W}_i|$, for $i \in N$, and $|\mathcal{W}|$ can be computed in $O(\Delta n)$ time and $O(\Delta)$ space, where $\Delta = \min(q, \bar{w} - q + 1)$.

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- Let $T_{-i}(x)$ be the number of losing coalitions $S \in \mathcal{L}$, with $w(S) = x$ and $i \notin S$.

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- All the computation can be done in the desired time bounds.

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- With a symmetric definition of $T_{+i}(x)$ we can express $\eta_i(\Gamma)$ in a similar way.
- The other values can be expressed as sums of $T_{-i}(x)$ and/or $T_{+i}(x)$

EndProof.

Other power indices

- In a similar way, it can be shown that the Shapley-Shubick index can be computed in $O(\Delta n^2)$ time using $O(\Delta n)$ memory.

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- Other power indices can be computed using similar techniques, see [\[Staudacher et al., Operations research and decisions 2:123–145, 2021\]](#)
- [CoopGame](#) is a R-package implementing most of the results in the paper.